Following a dramatic shootout between police and 2 heavily armed suspects wearing body armor in North Hollywood in 1997 the California State Legislature passed a law banning violent felons from owning body amour. Last week the California Court of appeal overturned the law citing issues with how the term body amour is defined in the legislation. The Los Angles Police Protective League the union representing LAPD officers will be asking the state attorney general to file an appeal before the California Supreme Court.
Author Archives: Menno Zacharias
Crimestat 2009 Wrap Up
Crimestat Numbers – 2009 Wrap Up↑
In July of 2009 the Winnipeg Police Service Crimestat site showed a year to date reduction of 18% for the crime categories tracked by Crimestat compared to the same period in 2008.
That number has now slipped to 11%.
As indicated in the original post the overall reduction in crime numbers is driven by a decrease in the number of actual and attempted auto thefts.
When the auto theft numbers were removed from the equation, the July numbers showed an overall increase of 6% in the other crime categories being tracked. By year end that number has now doubled to 12%.
The upward trend is still driven by an increase in the number of residential break-ins (+11% January to July, +20 % January to December) and non-commercial robberies (+38% January to July, +38% January to December).
Those percentages don’t really drive home the reality which is: in 2009, 487 more people had their houses broken into. As well, 409 more people in Winnipeg were mugged in 2009 than in 2008.
This leads to the inevitable question: why? Setting aside auto theft and attempts, why are crimes in 6 of the 8 other categories of crime tracked by Crimestat higher in 2009 than in 2008? Is Crimestat a flawed system? Is it an approach that works in other cities but not in Winnipeg? Are the tried and true principles first introduced by William Bratton and his team in New York City in the mid -1990’s no longer relevant?
A subsequent post will review the 4 principles that form the basis of the Crimestat approach and attempt to answer these questions and, in particular, the question, Is Crimestat broken?
Mayor Follows Lastman’s Lead
In 2002 Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman reached out to shake the hand of a member of the Hells Angels, unleashing a fire storm of protest from police officials in Ontario. Gerald Tremblay, the mayor of Montréal at the time who, unlike mayor Lastman, had an understanding and appreciation of what the Hells Angels were all about condemned it as well.
In Winnipeg this week the publication of a photo showing Winnipeg’s mayor wearing a big grin and posing with former gang members, some with charges still outstanding, didn’t seem to ruffle too many feathers.
Seven years ago mayor Lastman attempted to deflect criticism by using the ignorance defense, claiming he did not know who the Hells Angels were. Winnipeg’s mayor employed a similar defense, claiming ignorance of the fact that any of the men he was posing with had outstanding criminal charges. It worked for Lastman. Or did it?
In the Toronto case the mayor’s actions were soundly criticized by then Toronto Police Chief Julian Fantino as well as the head of the police union.
Mayor Katz probably does not have to worry that his actions will be criticized by the Winnipeg police. The Mayor is invoking the ‘police made me do it’ line of defense to bolster the ‘I didn’t know’ defense. According to the mayor the only reason he posed for the picture was because the police asked him to do it.
Police in Winnipeg say the photo will be helpful in conducting background checks. Does that suggest that the background checks were not conducted and the personal histories of these people were not known prior to the police service advising or asking the mayor to pose for the picture?
This would seem to be a situation where either the mayor is receiving bad advice from the ‘experts’, or he is exercising poor judgment in terms of dealing with the advice he is receiving. Perhaps the so called experts in this instance are also lacking better judgment.
Enlisting the help of ‘reformed’ gang members to help fight the gang problem is not new to Winnipeg. Former Chief of Police Dave Cassels got himself in a lot of hot water over the issue. More recently the Pappiiwak halfway house fiasco illustrated the pitfalls of taking the word of ex gang members at face value.
When governments are approached by former gang members wanting to initiate gang prevention programs, governments have the upper hand. These people want something, usually funding. This puts government in the driver’s seat. At a very minimum government and the police should:
- Check for outstanding warrants;
- Conduct a criminal record check;
- Conduct an in-depth background investigation similar to the kind the police do on prospective recruits;
- Insist that those involved have been pardoned, or at a minimum, have applied for a pardon.
This is not to suggest that gang prevention strategies cannot or should not involve ‘flying with the crows’. Flying with the crows, however, comes with its own set of risks. By taking the appropriate measures up front one can at least be prepared.
Of prime importance is that governments, when they embark on gang prevention strategies involving ex-criminals, ensure they are indeed ex-criminals. There must at a minimum be a ‘do no further harm’ guarantee. There must be a high (very high) probability that those enrolled in such programs will be helped, not further corrupted.
Photo Radar in Winnipeg
This is the first in a series of articles that will examine the emergence of photo radar as a traffic enforcement tool, its implementation in Winnipeg and the future prospects for photo radar.
Introduction: Why Photo Radar?
During the past two decades many police agencies including the Winnipeg Police Service saw an increase in the demand for police services. In some cities the crime rate increased, while in others the crime rate was relatively stable but the complexity of the issues being dealt with required the assignment of additional resources. Issues such as illicit drug laboratories, computer based crime, residential grow operations, auto theft and the increased sophistication of organized gangs all contributed to the complexity of policing. These issues and others led to the creation of additional specialized units in many major Canadian cities. These specializing units drew resources away from traditional areas of policing such as traffic enforcement and mobile uniform and beat patrol.
As resources were being siphoned away from traffic units, traffic enforcement lost its lustre in terms of a career option for young officers. Traffic units stopped attracting the brightest and the best young officers in the same volume as in the past. Upwardly mobile officers with career aspirations instead opted to go to other specialty units that offered greater rewards, both short-term in terms of the type of work and the possibility to earn overtime, and long-term, in terms of promotability.
In some cities this combination of factors resulted in traffic units operating with high vacancy rates. Efficient traffic units promote road safety and perform a vital enforcement function. A by-product of enforcement is ongoing revenue for the city from traffic fines. As the number of officers assigned to traffic units shrunk and the enforcement capabilities diminished, some police agencies embraced photo radar technology as a means of filling the void. Photo radar presented itself as a technological alternative to traditional enforcement of traffic laws (speeding and running red lights) that required minimal police resources in terms of personnel.
In order for a new approach to be successful, the initiative requires the support of the public. Most jurisdictions that introduced photo radar did so in a staged and deliberate manner designed to garner public support for the road safety aspect of the program. Among police there was a genuine belief that photo radar would reduce infractions, especially speeding and red-light running, and result in safer streets. Most jurisdictions very carefully crafted their photo radar messages around the safety theme and were able, on the merits of the case presented, to convince the public that photo radar was desirable. This was especially necessary in Manitoba. Photo radar required the enactment of the enabling legislation by the province. This was a highly charged political issue. After the experience in Ontario no provincial government was about to bring in photo radar legislation without significant public support for the concept.
Although police genuinely saw increased traffic enforcement using photo radar technology as a safety issue, it soon became apparent that many politicians saw it primarily as a huge, untapped source of potential revenue. In some cities this caused significant strains between police agencies and their civilian oversight bodies. The foundation for a potential break down of public support for the program was laid when photo radar morphed from a safety issue to a political issue. Projecting revenue expectations from photo radar as part of the budget process put significant pressure on the police to achieve revenue targets, not road safety targets. By necessity police attention was diverted from the safety aspects of the program to the revenue aspects. Decisions that should have been evidence based and related to safety became tactical and revenue based.
The evolution of photo radar in Winnipeg is a classic example of what happens when politics and revenue generation overshadow the safety aspects of a program.
Road safety issues are addressed in a long-term context. Take, as an example, the impaired driving initiative. It took many years of dedicated effort to change the public mindset about impaired driving. This was accomplished through a combination of education, changes in the law and selective enforcement. It took a generation for the attitude to take hold.
Politics on the other hand, especially at the municipal level, involves a short-term mindset – often the length of the current term. This contributes to a ‘ride that horse until it drops/ milk this cow until it’s dry’ mentality. When photo radar becomes ‘all about the money’ the safety aspect of the program is eroded and public support diminishes.
Winnipeg may need to redefine its vision for photo radar, clarify its mandate and rebuild the almost universal public trust the program once enjoyed.
Subsequent posts will examine:
- Photo radar technology;
- Introducing photo radar to Winnipeg, the process;
- The move from a road safety program to a revenue source;
- Photo radar in Winnipeg – the future.
A Helicopter for the Winnipeg Police – Part 4
When I wrote Part 3 I did not anticipate a need to write a Part 4.
I wasn’t operating under the naïve assumption that anything anyone said on the issue would reverse a decision that had already been made. I was confident ‘the cat was already in the bag’.
I did, however, believe that, as the mayor has a majority on council to support his position, just as a matter of process the $75,000.00 Winnipeg Police Service Helicopter Report would be made available to all the decision makers prior to the vote. Such a move could have been made to look like a gesture of openness and transparency. The release of the report, 6 months in the making if it contains all the required information, could have quelled the debate. It would have answered all those unanswered questions and removed the need to simply ‘trust the experts’.
So what is the rationale behind the $75,000.00 report being kept under wraps until sometime in the New Year? Here are two possible scenarios:
Scenario 1: That the report is so woefully lacking in terms of addressing the cost/benefit aspect of the helicopter acquisition the mayor would be embarrassed to stake his reputation in support of the helicopter on the document. The passage of a few weeks or months will ensure that this issue will have moved to the backburner in the minds of most Winnipeggers. When the report is made public most will treat it as old news.
Number 2. That the report is woefully incomplete and the additional time period from now until its release will be used to shore up its inadequacies so as to not embarrass the decision makers (i.e. those who had access to the report) in terms of the basis on which they made their decision.
We may never know the answer or reasoning behind the delay in releasing the report. If, however, we were in a position to compare the final report when it is released in 2010 to the version of the report the key decision makers no doubt had access to in November of 2009, the question about the delay in its release might be answered.
One last point about the decision making process on this issue centers on the council debate of the issue on December 15th. (I cannot quote from Council Hansard as its publication is 6 weeks behind). As I understand it, several councilors resorted to emotional and anecdotal arguments in support of their position, specifically, the death of Mr. Zdzislaw Andrzejczak. The circumstance under which he died is a tragedy in the first magnitude. To attempt to insert that tragic situation into the debate without factual basis demonstrates that the councilors in question are perhaps true politicians. It also exposes flaws in their decision making processes.
The mayor, behaving a lot like a politician (which he originally claimed he was not), attempted to walk a very fine line on this issue. On one hand, he agreed with the councilors’ conclusions and then in the next breath, conveniently distanced himself.
Perhaps it’s time that the debate at the civic level be raised a notch or two. If the debate contained more facts (what they know) as opposed to supposition (what they think they know) we might all be better off. One thing is certain, fewer words would be used but the taxpayers would have a better understanding of what is really happening.
One can only wonder at the questions the other $428 million in capital spending would have raised had it been subjected to closer scrutiny. Astute parliamentarians have been known to insert red herrings into omnibus bills to divert attention away from the more substantive aspects of a bill. Was the last minute introduction of the police helicopter a red herring designed to ensure that the remainder of the capital budget slid through the system largely unnoticed like ‘…. though a goose’ as one councilor likes to say?
Will the New PSB Please Step Forward
The New Mega Public Safety Building
This is the first in a series of articles examining the re-location of police headquarters from 151 Princess Street to 266 Graham Avenue. This series will take a look at the expressed operational rationale behind the move and the related costs.
The Question: Which building will the Winnipeg Police Service be moving into when they vacate the Public Safety Building?
A) The Winnipeg Post Office office tower at 266 Graham, 
OR
B) The Winnipeg Mail Processing Plant, (WMPP) illustrated in the photo below?
The Answer: B, the Mail Prosessing Plant
There is a lot of buzz in Winnipeg these days, especially in the police community, about what has been dubbed as the new ‘Mega PSB’. The $135 million plan recently approved by council will see police moving out of its current headquarters, the Public Safety Building at 151 Princess Street, by 2013.
Which space are they actually moving into? If your impression is that it will be the office tower facing Graham Avenue, featured on the City of Winnipeg website as the new headquaters, then you have the wrong impression. In this case what you see is not what you get. * (See web link below) You can’t be blamed entirely, though. The mayor and the city spin doctors (another example of your tax dollars at work) have done a nice job of spinning this one.
The portion of the property that the police are actually getting is the old Winnipeg Mail Processing Plant – the dumpy, or shall we say, squat, four-storey structure at the south end of the property and not the impressive office tower that has been so prominently featured in the media. (Of course, once you put that brand spanking-new shooting range on top, it might not look so squat.) The public seems to have concluded, almost unanimously, that the police were moving into the office tower. But even with the best spin it is difficult to fool all of the people all of the time.
In fairness the report prepared for Council when carefully read implies that the police won’t be getting the office tower. As is so often the case, interpretation becomes important and the devil is truly in the details. ** In this instance, the ‘details’ reveal that the portion of the property being redeveloped is limited to the Winnipeg Mail Processing Plant and does not include the office tower which served as the backdrop for the ‘turning over the key/early Christmas present ceremony’ orchestrated by the City. The office tower portion of the property, it turns out, is tied up in existing leases and options and will not likely be available for police use for the next 15 years.
The current plan calls for the city to develop approximately half a million square feet of space for police use at a cost of $135 million: $30 million to purchase the building and another $105 million to do the upgrades. There are some important unanswered questions hanging in the air. Anyone who has restored an old building, or watched This Old House knows that when you revive old buildings they can become money pits. Does buying and restoring a 55 year old building to replace a 45 year old building (PSB), the interior of which has been recently and extensively upgraded, make good sense from a practical business perspective? Were other options considered? Can this project be brought in on budget or is there a risk that this project will become a public money pit with Winnipeg taxpayers footing bill?
Frankly, a more thorough examination of the monetary and non-monetary reasons put forward by the Police Service and the Property and Development Department in support of this proposal is needed. Is the space being redeveloped adequate to house all Divisions, Units, and services being proposed for relocation to the site? Is relocation of units such as the Professional Standards Unit within the confines of a police station appropriate? Are the operational advantages and savings cited in the report real or are they empty words used to prop up the proposal and make it easier for decision makers to arrive at the ‘right’ decision?
Those issues and questions as well as others will be examined in future posts.
In the meantime, a quick memo to Sponsor Winnipeg: Now that the City owns the building at 266 Graham, best to put it on the naming block, and consider removing the Winnipeg Square Parkade in light of the fact that the City has already paid someone $400,000 in commissions to sell that particular property.
* Image of Post Office Tower from the City of Winnipeg website at:
http://winnipeg.ca/interhom/headquarters.stm
** Complete report on the City acquisition of the property at 266 Graham Avenue is available at:
http://winnipeg.ca/clkdmis/ViewDoc.asp?DocId=9721&SectionId=&InitUrl=
Peel’s Ninth Principle
Principle Nine
To recognize always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.
In 1829 the word ‘efficiency’ had a broader meaning in the context of measuring organizational performance than it does now. As performance measurement has progressed, organizational performance measurement has been divided into two distinct areas, efficiency measurement and effectiveness measurement. In 1829 the term efficiency essentially embodied the meaning of both those terms. As the word is used in the Ninth Principle it embodies both the concept of delivering a service at a reasonable price, and delivering a service that has the desired outcomes.
This principle is one of the first to express the need to test or measure police performance. It essentially says the emphasis should be on outcomes as opposed to outputs. In this context the desired outcome is the absence of crime and disorder, the outputs are the actions undertaken by police to achieve the outcome.
Efficiency is measured in terms of cost, i.e. are tax payers receiving good value for their tax dollars? In the policing context cost is examined at various levels. At the highest level cost would be looked at as the per capita cost of policing. The per capita cost of policing in Winnipeg according to the Winnipeg Police 2008 Annual Report was $259.40.* Cost can also be calculated on a per-unit of service basis. As an example, the cost of issuing a photo radar ticket in Winnipeg was reported to cost $48.01 in 2004. ** Once established, cost figures can then be compared to costs reported by other police agencies to determine a relative level of efficiency.
Establishing whether the organization is effective is more difficult and involves an examination of whether the organization is doing the right things to achieve its stated goals. Most police agencies have a stated or at least implied goal of reducing crime and disorder. Effectiveness measures establish whether the strategies, approaches and tactics employed result in the desired outcomes. In Winnipeg, as an example, the Police have employed an innovative strategy to address the auto theft issue. The stated goal was to reduce auto- theft. With reductions of 16, 37 and 43 percent between 2006 and 2008 the strategy can be judged to be effective. * The desired outcome was realized.
Many public service delivery organizations (both policing and non police) have become overly politicized. In the case of municipal policing, police departments can become extensions of their political masters – especially if there are no effective buffers between the police and the mayor. This is most clearly demonstrated in the United States where the links between municipal policing and mayors is closer than in Canada. In the United States the mayor’s agenda frequently becomes the police agenda. In some major American cities the position of Chief of Police is essentially a political appointment. Many mayors in large American cities run on law and order platforms and one of the first things they do when elected is to appoint a new police chief whose approach and values are in keeping with their own. Miami and Atlanta are recent examples of this phenomenon.
The more politicized an agency becomes the greater the emphasis on activities, or in Peel’s words, “visible evidence of police action”. The emphasis on action allows both the politicians and the police to be seen to be doing something. The emphasis on action can detract from a close examination of the services being delivered. Program evaluation is mandatory to determine if the actions undertaken are yielding the desired results in terms of outcomes. The action orientation tends to discourage evaluation.
Daily news conferences held by police agencies are intended to inform the public through the media of crime that is currently occurring in the community and, of course, what the police are doing about it (actions). News conferences are not the forum in which to discuss outcomes.
Reporting to the public on outcomes is more appropriate in an annual report. Most police agencies, however, give limited coverage to reporting on outcomes in their annual reports choosing instead to highlight activities. It is the statistical portion of the annual report that tells the real story about police efficiency and effectiveness, not the pictures and stories. Statistical reporting, however, accounts for only 10% (in terms of volume) of most police agency annual reports.
Some progressive police departments actually publish meaningful business and strategic plans that outline in detail police priorities and goals for the next 1-3 years. The degree of goal achievement is reported upon in subsequent years and in some cases during the course of the current year. Generally the goals relate to crime reduction or the restoration of order in the community and reflect an attempt by police to deliver services and measure their outputs and outcomes in keeping with this principle as opposed to simply reporting on their activities.
In order to achieve outcomes police agencies need to state their goals and objectives up front and then report on their progress. This needs to become part of the public accountability process. In order for police to establish widespread public support they need to be accountable to the public.
The Vancouver Police Department publishes an Annual Business Plan which lists both its goals and the strategies that will be employed to achieve the goals. *** It serves as a good example for police agencies that do not formulate or publish meaningful business or strategic plans.
*Winnipeg Police 2008 Annual Report. Available at http://www.winnipeg.ca/police/annualreports/2008/2008_WPS_Annual_Report_English.pdf
** City of Winnipeg Photo Radar Audit. Available at http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2006/winnipegaudit.pdf
*** Vancouver Police Department, 2009 Annual Business Plan. Available at http://vancouver.ca/police/policeboard/agenda/2009/090121/8VPD2009BusPlan.pdf
Helicopter Naming Rights
Today the City’s Executive Policy Committee approved the capital expenditure for the purchase of a helicopter for the Winnipeg Police Service. Already, the spin from City Hall is taking the citizens of Winnipeg on a new course. It is no longer just a helicopter: it is now a “Crime Copter”. A catchy phrase with a strong ‘law and order and tough on crime’ ring to it. Politicians are astute enough to recognize the benefits of portraying that image.
Personally, I was not surprised to see our Mayor come up with the required funding for the so-called Crime Copter. It seems at budget time there are always a few hidden pockets or hats with rabbits or money in them tucked away for pet projects. The helicopter money was a nice ‘pull from the hat’ at the eleventh-hour.
What did surprise me was the discovery that the helicopter was listed on the Sponsor Winnipeg website as one of the city assets available for naming rights. Had the debate about the merits of purchasing a helicopter been legitimate the posting of the naming rights would have been delayed until the funding decision was made, if for no other reason than for the sake of perception. Some people may have naively concluded that as the issue was being debated and winding its way to EPC for a vote, a final decision was still pending. Listing the helicopter as being available for naming rights two weeks prior to the vote suggests the decision to purchase a helicopter was made at least two weeks ago, maybe longer, but certainly not today.
Listing a city asset as being available for naming rights before the decision to even acquire the asset is finalized is, if not an abuse of process , at the very least, inappropriate. One could simply dismiss it as a scenario where the organization is so large that the left hand is not aware of what the right hand is doing. Or, is it instead a situation where the right hand is simply arrogant.
Perhaps the City should take a closer look at what else is on the ‘naming block’ and make sure we own it before naming rights are awarded.
The link below will take you to the Sponsor Winnipeg website:
A Helicopter for the Winnipeg Police – Part 3
Part 3
Parts 1 and 2 likely conveyed a hint of cynicism. Any cynicism would be based on an examination of various documents: specifically, the most recently available Winnipeg Police Business Plan and the recently submitted Capital Budget request. Neither mentions a helicopter which might suggest that acquiring one is a ‘Johnny come lately’ idea.
Based on media reports, it would appear that acquiring a helicopter was not high on the minds of anyone – not the mayor, the police service, nor the province – until the idea was refloated by the Winnipeg Sun about a year ago. Was there a memo somewhere that decisions re police tactics and approaches now come under the umbrella of the Winnipeg Sun?!
Be that as it may, at least according to newspaper reports, a Sun reporter brought up the topic with the police service a few months later and they subsequently agreed to study the issue.
Could it be that the Sun’s giddiness about a helicopter is related to a desire for naming rights? ‘Sun 1’ has a nice ring to it and goes well with the ‘midnight sun’ feature most police helicopters are equipped with. Perhaps the mayor’s ‘put your name on a piece of Winnipeg’ campaign is about to pay off.
The study of the issue by police started some 10 months ago. The report generated by that study has not been shared publicly. Perhaps the mayor has a copy, but it’s probably too complicated for the tax paying masses to comprehend.
What the Report Most Likely Contains
One can only guess at what is contained in the report. Probably fairly precise figures as to the cost of purchasing a helicopter together with the cost of the special equipment required in order for a helicopter to be useful in an urban setting. It may outline additional costs relating to leasing hangar space. Appropriate housing space is critical if the helicopter is to meet the “it can be in the air in a matter of minutes” criteria expressed by the Winnipeg Police Service, especially on those minus 30 degree days. Suffice it to say the purchase and storage costs are the easiest to estimate and will be in the report.
Based on the experience of other police departments, the operating costs can also be determined with a high degree of precision. A figure for salary costs (pilot and spotter), plus fuel, maintenance, insurance etc., can all be plugged into the costing formula.
Determining the cost side is the easy part. It’s determining the benefits side that requires greater discussion and presents more challenges.
The Report will no doubt contain operational performance information from other police departments such as Edmonton and Calgary listing total flight hours, response times, vehicle pursuits and foot chases managed, as well as the number of arrests directly attributable to the presence of the helicopter. And by the way, Winnipeg must be looking at some kind of ‘super’ whirlybird as, according to the Winnipeg Police, it’s expected to be in the air some “4 to 5 hours a day”. That is actually quite amazing: the Edmonton police helicopter, for example, had an all time high of 1150 flight hours in 2007 which equates to 3.15 hours of flight time when averaged over 365 days. There is a limit to how many hours a year a helicopter can be flown from a technical maintenance and safety standpoint. The only way to achieve the suggested four to five hours a day would be to restrict the helicopter to only flying between 230 and 287 days a year.
Without questioning the validity of the figures from other police agencies the definition of the terms being used is important. One must remember that when new programs, or equipment acquisitions (particularly expensive ones as in this case) are being evaluated, the definition of terms such as ‘arrest directly attributable to’ becomes important in terms of evaluating the actual role played by the new technology or approach that is under study.
The report, in addition, will no doubt include one of the mayor’s favorite lines of reasoning about how in terms of efficiency a helicopter on the ground is the equivalent to a large number of police officers on the ground. A study conducted by KPMG pegged that figure at 15 two-person units. That’s a ratio of 30:1 – even higher than the 18:1 ratio the mayor talked about.
What the Report Should Contain
The report should reflect the realities of policing in Winnipeg with the ultimate decision being based on a careful examination of the intended use of a helicopter.
This would involve preparing a list of all the call types (situations and scenarios) to which a helicopter would be most likely dispatched.
A review of historic calls for service data would determine the frequency of the types of calls identified for helicopter dispatch. (Such an analysis should be mandatory in any event to determine when most of those calls occur so as to best determine during which hours of the day a helicopter should be deployed.) Once those data are available the following questions need to be answered:
- How many calls identified for helicopter dispatch ( vehicle pursuits, pursuits of suspects on foot, and of course those other examples cited – putting snipers on roofs, locating lost elderly people in the Assiniboine forest) occur in Winnipeg on an annual basis;
- How many of those calls occur during the proposed helicopter flight hours;
- In what percentage of cases would the presence of a helicopter make an appreciable difference in terms of a successful conclusion to the call for service/incident?
Only once those numbers have been determined, can the cost per incident of helicopter usage be established. It’s simple mathematics.
Even that step is fairly basic compared to establishing the benefits. Benefits come in the form of either real savings or opportunity savings. ‘Savings’ in this context are not usually calculated in terms of millions of dollars that can be removed from the police budget; rather, they are primarily in the form of opportunity savings. Opportunity savings are defined as savings in terms of freeing up resources to do other things because of the deployment of a helicopter.
Consider the scenario of a helicopter being dispatched to do a flyover over of a ‘brawl’ that involves a large number of brawlers. (This is an example given by the Winnipeg Police although no media reporting of brawls comes to mind.) Further, suppose the helicopter crew were to determine that it was actually a fight between two or three people as opposed to a brawl involving a large number of people and therefore less likely to spin out of control or require a large police presence. In such a case the patrol units dispatched to the event could be diverted to other activities, thereby creating an opportunity saving. In other words, instead of wasting their time driving to a non-existent brawl they could perform other policing functions. Opportunity savings, if properly invested, can enhance efficiency and effectiveness.
The report should address all potential opportunity-saving scenarios and once those are quantified, the next step would be to address the issue of how those ‘savings’ would be invested. Unless those savings can be directed into specific areas of police operations and used to translate operational activities into tangible outcomes (such as a reduction in response times, the overall crime rate, or a reduction in crime rate related to specific crimes, i.e. residential break in or non-commercial robberies which are currently on the rise in Winnipeg), the savings would be meaningless. They become nothing more than paper tigers in support of a weak argument.
Once the capital and operational costs, the per-call cost, and the question of how the opportunity savings will be invested has been determined, politicians can start wrapping their heads around the issue and intelligently address the appropriate question, that is, do the Winnipeg Police need a helicopter vs. the want aspect of the question.
The following questions need to be answered by our politicians: Can the per incident cost of having a helicopter be justified? Are the opportunity savings real, and have they been presented in the form of evidence based outcomes that are measureable? Lastly, if the police service were given 1 to 1.5 million dollars of new money annually with the understanding it was to be applied to the most effective and most efficient means of preventing crime, reducing crime, and enhancing community safety, would they then use it to purchase a helicopter?
Taser Cams
What is a Taser Cam? Quite simply it’s a digital audio and video recording device that’s attached to the battery that powers the Taser.
What does the Taser Cam do? Once the Taser is removed from its holster and activated it starts recording.
What does the Taser Cam cost? $400 to $500 (USD) per unit.
Which model of Taser will accommodate the Taser Cam? Model X26
Which model of Taser do the Winnipeg Police use? Model X26
How many Tasers does the Winnipeg Police Service have? In the range of 175
What would it cost to equip the Winnipeg Police Service with Taser Cams? Between 70 and 90 thousand dollars
Why don’t the Winnipeg Police use Taser Cams? That’s a question worth considering.
Based on the 2010 capital budget submissions it seems that the Winnipeg Police Service is preparing to spend a fair bit of cash on digital recording technology. The 2010-2015 preliminary capital budget contains $523,000.00 for digital recoding devices in interview rooms in 2012. It also contains $1,000,000.00 (yes you read that right, it’s one million) for an officer mobile video system in 2015. These preliminary capital budget figures would seem to suggest that capturing the actions of officers and suspects on video is of some importance.
Capturing the actions of officers on video is especially important in circumstances where force is used. This became very apparent as the Braidwood Inquiry into the RCMP use of Taser at the Vancouver airport unfolded. The Braidwood Inquiry was able to rely on some video recorded by a by-stander but in most cases police use of Tasers is unrecorded. Unrecorded, despite the fact that the technology to do so exists, and is relatively affordable. Using an estimate of 175 Taser units the cost of equipping the Winnipeg Police Service with Taser Cam would be under 100 thousand dollars.
With the existing climate in Canada regarding Taser use it is in everyone’s interest to record their use. A video of each and every Taser deployment would establish an unbiased record of what took place. It would serve to protect both the public and the police. It would curb any misuse of Tasers by police, and it would nullify complaints against police about Taser use in situations where they were clearly appropriately deployed.
Perhaps this is any area where Standing Committee on Protection and Community Services could ask the police to do a study and submit a report. Careful examination might reveal that although the police have not asked for and perhaps don’t want Taser Cams, they may actually need them.
Pictured below (left) is the Taser Cam and (right) a Taser X26 gun. (Images retrieved from the Taser International website on 09 11 24) http://www.taser.com/products/law/Pages/default.aspx
Policing, Politics and Public Policy 
